Introduction
The empirical study of con ‡ict has recently generated an increasing interest among social scientists and, in particular, economists. Many factors have been proposed as likely causes of civil wars. This set of variables frequently includes measures of economic inequality and, more recently, polarization. This chapter aims at reviewing the theory and evidence on the e¤ect of inequality and polarization, in di¤erent versions, on the likelihood of social con ‡icts, civil wars and periods of extreme violence. The original empirical research adopted a macroeconomic perspective (cross-country), although recent research has taken a microeconometric approach (within countries). Most of the literature is quite recent and, therefore, this will be a very fruitful line of research in years to come.
The dynamics of con ‡ict should be understood as a process, ignited by a shock and propagated by many alternative mechanisms. For instance, one of the shocks could be an abrupt change in the price of the primary commodity, a natural disaster, the assassination of a political leader, etc. The taxonomy of potential propagation mechanisms includes economic inequality, social di¤erences, ethnic polarization, bad institutions, etc. In all cases the propagation mechanisms are crucial to understand which countries are resilient to con ‡icts in the presence of shocks. Poverty, bad institutions, ethnic di¤erences, and abundance of natural resources, among others, could be important propagation mechanisms. Inequality and polarization should be understood as particular propagation mechanisms that could be present together with other propagating elements.
The chapter is organized as follows. First of all we discuss some conceptual issues in the measurement of inequality and polarization. Section two explains the theoretical relationship among di¤erent measures of inequality and polarization. The second section considers also the empirical implementation of measures based on a dichotomous (belong/do not belong) criterion. The third section analyzes the empirical measure of inequality, polarization and other measures of social heterogeneity. It also discusses the e¤ect of using alternative databases and classi…cations of ethnic/religious groups on the measurement of inequality and polarization. Section three presents also a novel comparison of the e¤ects on the level of fractionalization and polarization of using alternative datasets to calculate these indices. Section fourth summarizes the relevant research on the empirics of inequality, polarization and the likelihood of con ‡icts. The …nal section presents the conclusions and 2 ideas for future research.
Conceptual issues on the measurement of inequality and polarization
The measurement of inequality has a long tradition in economics. The topic is immense and, therefore, we are going to restrict ourselves to concepts and measures of inequality that have been used in connection with con ‡ict or civil wars. First of all, and even though in recent times some have proposed to measure new concepts of inequality, like inequality of opportunities (Roemer 1998) , we are going to work with the usual concept (inequality of outcomes). The equality of opportunities has been operationalized (see for instance World Bank 2006) but, up to now, it has not been used to explain the likelihood of con ‡icts. Second, there are many possible measures of inequality: quantile based (for instance income of the highest 5% over income of the lowest 25%), the standard deviation of income, the Gini index, the Atkinson index, the Theil index, etc. Since we want to relate the concept of inequality with the measure of polarization, and we need the ‡exibility to accommodate dichotomous categories, this chapter relies heavily on the use of the Gini index. Finally, there are other measure which do not belong, strictly speaking, neither to the category of inequality measures nor to any class of polarization indicators, that have been used in the analysis of the causes of con ‡ict. However, these variables re ‡ect diversity in an speci…c dimension. For instance, in the case of discrete categories, the size of the dominant groups has been used as a predictor of the probability of con ‡ict. Strictly speaking, this indicator is not an index of inequality nor polarization but it measures a dimension of diversity, or dominance. In this chapter we consider some of those ad-hoc measures, although the emphasis is on measures of inequality and polarization. The basic distinction used in this section is the di¤erence between Euclidean based measures of inequality (polarization) and discrete distance measures. The …rst class of measures (based on the Euclidean distance) is used mostly in the context of continuous variables like income or wealth. The second class of indicators (based on discrete distances) is used to calculate inequality and polarization in dimensions that are discrete like being part of an ethnic or a religious groups. In this case we do not try to measure the di¤erence in income between two individuals but if they belong or not to the same ethnic/religious/cultural group. For this reason we have a discrete measure of distance (belong or do not belong to a particular group).
The Euclidean distance case
Although we commonly use the word "income", these measures apply to any social dimension that can be ordered along the real line, for example income, ideology, wealth, etc. We use most of the time income inequality as a canonical example.
Income inequality
One of the most popular measures of inequality is the Gini index, G, that has the general form
where y i represent the income level of groups i, and i is its proportion with respect to the total population. This formulation is specially suited to measure income and wealth inequality. As we argued before, there are many other measures of inequality but the Gini index is the most popular and it is also quite common as an explanatory variable in empirical studies of the causes of con ‡ict. The formulation of the Gini index is closely related with the index of polarization.
Income polarization
The concept of polarization is more elusive. One of the reasons is that is was not formally characterized until recently while the indices of inequality have a long tradition in economics. The measurement of polarization in a one-dimensional set-up was initiated by Wolfson (1994) and Esteban and Ray (1994) (ER) . But what do they mean by polarization? Esteban and Ray (1994) provide a particular conceptualization of polarization, emphasizing the di¤erence between inequality and income polarization. A population of individuals may be grouped according to some vector of characteristics into "clusters" such that each cluster is similar in terms of the attributes of its members, but di¤erent clusters have members with "dissimilar" attributes. Such a society is polarized even though the measurement of inequality could be low. The following example gives an intuition on the meaning of polarization: suppose that initially the population is uniformly distributed over the deciles of income. Suppose that we collapse the distribution in two groups of equal size in deciles 3 and 8. Polarization has increased since the "middle class"has disappeared and group identity is stronger in the second situation. However inequality, measured by the Gini index or by any other inequality measure, has decreased.
By using three axioms, Esteban and Ray (1994) narrow down the class of allowable polarization measures (in a one-dimensional set up) to only one measure, P , with the following form
for some constants k > 0 and 2 (0; ] where ' 1:6. When = 0 and k = 1 this income polarization measure is precisely the Gini coe¢ cient. Therefore the fact that the share of each group is raised to the 1 + power, which exceeds one, is what makes the income polarization measure di¤erent from inequality measures. The parameter can be viwed as the degree of "polarization sensitivity."The dependence of the measure with respect to ; the number of groups and the discretization of income groups generates many alternative empirical indices for the same distribution of income. Esteban, Gardin and Ray (2007) show an application of the index of polarization to income distributions.
Recently, Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) develop a measurement theory of polarization for the case of income distributions that can be described using density functions. The main theorem uniquely characterizes a class of polarization measures that …ts into what they call the "identity-alienation" framework, and simultaneously satis…es a set of axioms. Second, they provide sample estimators of population polarization indices that can be used to compare polarization across time or entities. Distribution-free statistical inference results are also used in order to ensure that the ordering of polarization across entities are not simply due to sampling noise. An illustration of the use of these tools using data from 21 countries shows that polarization and inequality ordering can often di¤er in practice. 5 
The Discrete distance case
Both, the income polarization (a particularly important case of one-dimensional polarization) and the Gini index, assume that distances among groups are measured along the real line. Going from the real line to a discrete metric has important implications. In a context where distances are naturally discrete (belong/do not belong to a particular group) the groups cannot be ordered on the real line as in the case of income.
Would it be possible to measure "distance" across, for instance, ethnic groups? In principle it would be possible but, di¤erently from the case of income, it will be quite a subjective exercise. In addition the dynamics of the "we" versus "you" distinction is more powerful than the antagonism generated by the "distance" between them.
In addition, any classi…cation of ethnic groups requires a criterion to transform the di¤erences of the characteristics of ethnic groups into a discrete decision rule (for instances, same family-di¤erent family). For example, following the classi…cation of the World Christian Encyclopedia, the ethnic subgroup of the Luba, the Mongo and the Nguni belong to the Bantu ethnolinguistic group. The Akan, the Edo and the Ewe belong to the Kwa ethnolinguistic group. This implies that the "cultural distance"(de…ned informally by the Encyclopedia) between the subgroups of the Bantu group is smaller than the di¤erence between one of the subgroups of the Bantu family and one of the Kwa family. In terms of a discrete metric, by using the family classi…cation as the basis for the di¤erence across groups means that the subgroups of the Bantu family are inside the ball of radius r that de…nes the discrete metric while the subgroups in the family Kwa are outside that ball. Therefore, any classi…cation of ethnic groups involves implicitly a concept and a measure of "distance" that is discretized. For this reason we may want to consider only if an individual belongs or does not belong to an ethnic group.
Moreover, in the case of ethnic diversity the identity of the groups is less controversial than the "distance" between di¤erent ethnic groups, which is much more di¢ cult to measure than income or wealth. Then, it is reasonable to treat the "distance" across groups, (:; :); as generated by a discrete metric (1-0). There are two measures, analogous to the Gini index and the index of polarization, that are suitable for the discrete world: one of them is the index of fractionalization, and the other is the discrete polarization index. In section 2.3 we will show how these measures in the discrete world, can be 6 compared with the measures in the euclidean world.
The index of fractionalization
The index of fractionalization is the discrete version of the Gini index 1 . One particular indicator of this kind is the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), which has been used extensively as an indicator of ethnic heterogeneity 2 . In general any index of fractionalization can be written as
where i is the proportion of people that belong to the ethnic (religious) group i and N is the number of groups. The index of ethnic fractionalization has a simple interpretation as the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic group. 
The index of discrete polarization
We can derive also an index of polarization based on a discrete metric. The issue of how to construct such an index, which is appropriate to measure polarization, is the basic point discussed in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008, 2005a Taylor and Hudson (1972) . See section 3 for a complete discussion on datasets available for the construction of indices of fractionalization.
3 Mauro (1995) uses this index as an instrument in his analysis of the e¤ect of corruption on investment. same size). A formal approach to capture this kind of situations is the index of ethnic polarization RQ, originally constructed by Reynal-Querol (2002). The proposed index of ethnic heterogeneity, RQ, aims to capture polarization instead of fractionalization using discrete metric.
The original purpose of this index was to capture how far is the distribution of the ethnic groups from the (1/2,0,0,...0,1/2) distribution (bipolar), which represents the highest level of polarization.
The RQ index considers, implicitly, that the distances are 0 (an individual belongs to the group) or 1 (it does not belong to the group), like the fractionalization index.
Comparing measures
In the previous subsections we presented a discussion of alternative measures of inequality and polarization in two cases: the case of continuous variables and the discrete (or discretized) variables case. The di¤erence between these two types of measures is related to the possibility of ordering the variable of interest along the real line. For instance, if we deal with income we can order individuals along the real line by their income. But when we are dealing with ethnicity the distance across groups is discrete (described by the criterion belong/do not belong to a particular ethnic group). In this section we compare the measures according to their main purpose (measuring inequality or polarization) and not, as in the previous section, according to the continuous/discrete nature of the variables of interest. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002, 2005a) show that the index of fractionalization can be interpreted as a Gini index with a discrete distance. Moreover, they also show that the measure of ethnic polarization, RQ, can be interpreted as the index of polarization of ER with discrete distances, by analogy to the relationship between the Gini index and the index of fractionalization. The rest of the section clari…es these relationships.
Income inequality versus ethnic fractionalization
The index of fractionalization has, at least, two theoretical justi…cations based on completely di¤erent contexts. In industrial organization the lit-erature on the relationship between market structure and pro…tability has used the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index to measure the level of market power in oligopolistic markets. The second theoretical foundation for the index of fractionalization comes from the theory of inequality measurement. One of the most popular measures of inequality is the Gini index, G, that has the general form
where y i represent the income level of groups i, i is its proportion with respect to the total population. If we substitute the Euclidean income distance (y i ; y j ) = jy i y j j, by a discrete metric (belong/do not belong)
Then the discrete Gini (DG) index can be written as
It is easy to show that the discrete Gini index (DG) calculated using a discrete metric is simply the index of fractionalization
Income polarization versus discrete polarization
We can perform a similar exercise to the one described in the previous section using the index of polarization. If we substitute the Euclidean metric (y i ; y j ) = jy i y j j, by a discrete metric
The class of indices of discrete polarization, DP; can be described as
which depends on the values of the parameters and k: Embedding a discrete metric into ER's polarization measure P alters the original formulation of the index as a polarization measure. It is known that the discrete metric and the Euclidean metric are not equivalent in R. For this reason the apparently minor change of the metric implies that the discrete polarization measure does not satisfy the properties of polarization 4 for all the range of possible values of : Therefore, for each possible , we have a di¤erent shape for the DP index. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) show that the only family of DP measures that satis…es the polarization properties is the one with = 1; DP (1; k): If we …x = 1; and choose k = 4 (which makes the range of the index DP (1; k) to lie between 0 and 1) then we obtain the RQ index 5 .
Other measures of ethnic heterogeneity
There are other indices that can measure di¤erent dimensions of ethnicity. For instance, Collier and Hoe-er (1998) introduce the index of dominance as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the size of the largest group is between 45% and 60% 6 . Others authors have used the size of the largest ethnic group as a single index of ethnicity. But many alternative indices are variations of the index of fractionalization. Fearon (2003) constructs an index of cultural fractionalization that uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the cultural distance between groups in a country. Cederman and Girardin (2007) propose an star-like con…guration of ethnic groups that rejects the symmetric interaction topology implied by the index of fractionalization. Using two assumptions, namely that state plays a central role in con ‡ict and that con ‡ict happens among groups and not among individuals, Cederman and Girardin (2007) construct the N* index which is a star-like con…guration centered around the ethnic group in power. La Ferrara et al. (2009) characterize an index that is informationally richer than the commonly used ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index. Their measure of fractionalization takes as a primitive the individuals, as opposed to ethnic groups, and uses information on the similarity among them. Compared to existing indices, their measure does not require that individuals are pre-assigned to exogenously determined categories or groups 7 . Desmet, Ortuño-Ortin and Wacziarg (2009) propose a new method to measure ethnolinguistic diversity and o¤er new results linking such diversity with a range of political economy outcomes -civil con ‡ict, redistribution, economic growth and the provision of public goods. They use linguistic trees, describing the genealogical relationship between the entire set of 6, 912 world languages, to compute measures of fractionalization and polarization at di¤erent levels of linguistic aggregation. By doing so, they let the data inform them on which linguistic cleavages are most relevant, rather than making ad-hoc choices of linguistic classi…cations. They …nd drastically di¤erent e¤ects of linguistic diversity at di¤erent levels of aggregation: deep cleavages, originating thousands of years ago, lead to measures of diversity that are better predictors of civil con ‡ict and redistribution than those that account for more recent and super…cial divisions. The opposite pattern holds when it comes to the impact of linguistic diversity on growth and public goods provision, where …ner distinctions between languages matter.
The data described in the previous section can allow the calculation of fractionalization and polarization at the country level. Recent studies propose to consider the spatial distribution of ethnic groups when calculating indices of ethnic diversity. Alesina, Easterly and Matuszeski (2006) compute measures of "arti…ciality" of states based on how straight borders split ethnic groups into two di¤erent adjacent countries. They are able to show that this measure is correlated with their economic and political success. Matuszeski and Schneider (2006) constructs a new index of Ethnic Diversity and Clustering (EDC) which measures the clustering or dispersion of ethnic groups within a country using digital maps over 7.000 linguistic groups and 190 countries. They argue that to focus on ethnic diversity at the country level misses the fact that the geographical overlap between di¤erent ethnic groups is the likely source of con ‡ict. Imagine that country 1 has two groups of equal size but one of them is in the East of the country and the other in the West without having any geographic overlap. Country 2 has also two groups of equal size but they share the same geographic area. The pattern of distribution of groups within the geographical area of those two countries is very di¤erent, which may have important consequences for political stability, redistributive policies, public expenditure, etc. Even though this new regional approach is very interesting, in this section we compare only the traditional datasets on di¤erences across countries, without considering the within country pattern of distribution of ethnic groups.
The empirical implementation of measures of ethnic fractionalization and polarization
In the previous section we have discussed conceptual issues related with the measurement of inequality and polarization. In this section we consider the empirical questions that arise when we try to implement a measure of fractionalization or polarization based on discrete classi…cations 8 . We argued before that the measure of income polarization, for instance, is complicated by the fact that you have to establish "a priori" the intervals of income that de…ne each group. In principle, when groups are de…ned "ex-ante", without any need to discretize, there should be no problem. Therefore, the calculation of discrete polarization or fractionalization does not su¤er from this inconvenience. However, the "ex-ante" nature of groups (ethnic, religious, cultural, etc.) does not isolate the discrete measures completely from problems derived from classi…cations. For instance, if we want to measure language fractionalization, what is the appropriate level of language aggregation to be used for the calculation of indices of fractionalization or discrete polarization? There are a few linguistic families but there are thousands of languages and dialects. Are they di¤erent ethnic groups if they speak the same language but di¤erent dialects? Should people that belong to the same racial subfamily be considered as separate ethnic groups or the same?
The issue of alternative classi…cations depending on the level of aggregation can be solved by using several levels of aggregation 9 . Other dimensions of ethnicity are di¢ cult to classify, or complicated to implement in empirical terms. For instance, in Latin America there are three basic ethnic groups: white, mestizo and indigenous. However, the line separating white and mestizo, or mestizo and indigenous, is vague 10 . Fearon (2003) proposes coding ethnic groups using surveys (when available) to determine the degree of social consensus about the de…nition of a particular ethnic group (including self-identity) 11 . This approach would potentially generate a di¤erent list of ethnic groups for countries otherwise identical in the structure of their ethnic groups. This is an interesting proposal, which is also in Caselli and Coleman (2006) . Posner (2004) proposes a index of fractionalization of politically relevant ethnic groups. But if the resulting groups are used to construct indices to be used in a regressions, then there is an important drawback: the classi…cation of groups will be endogenous to the intensity of con ‡ict between groups. An appropriate measure of ethnic diversity or ethnic polarization should measure potential con ‡ict and not actual con ‡ict or animosity across groups. Therefore, the level of aggregation/disaggregation of ethnic groups should not mix families, sub-families, peoples, etc. as a function of their actual level of con ‡ict, but should stick to a particular level of aggregation. Otherwise, it would be like trying to explain the causes of con ‡ict using con ‡ict as an explanatory variable.
There is also the issue of salience of ethnic characteristics. For instance, when a country has many ethnic groups, several religions and several languages, which is the dimension that should be considered in order to construct the relevant indices? The delineation of ethnic groups is complex because ethnicity is basically a multidimensional concept. Ethnicity covers, at least, language, race, color and religion. These di¤erent dimensions do not have to overlap perfectly, which implies that we can have as many ethnic classi…-cations as convex combinations of the characteristics that we can construct. Some classi…cations may be based only on linguistic di¤erences, others on race, etc. and some classi…cation may mix linguistic and race di¤erences, or linguistic and color, etc. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) mix di¤erent dimensions of ethnicity in an indicator that calculates the maximum level of fractionalization (polarization) in any dimension (race, language or religion). Therefore, they argue as the salient dimension the one with the maximum level of fractionalization (polarization). Caselli and Coleman (2006) consider that any characteristic (like color) that it is easy to perceive by other individuals and di¢ cult to change should be more important than mutable, or di¢ cult to assess, characteristics.
Data sources and classi…cation criteria
Having presented the caveats of empirical implementation, we now move to the data available to measure heterogeneity. Many authors have recently turned to the construction of datasets on state's ethnic groups to test the empirical predictions of alternatives hypothesis. The purpose of this section is to clarify and compare the similarities and di¤erences between alternative datasets on ethnolinguistic diversity. Additionally, we present a comparative analysis of the most popular indices of diversity, or aggregators of the ethnolinguistic groups into a single index. The …nal objective of this section is to answer several questions: are these alternative classi…cations very di¤erent to each other? Does it matter for the construction of a single index if one uses one particular classi…cation or another?
Researchers have used several sources of data on ethnic diversity. The most popular are the Atlas Nadorov Mira, the CIA World Factbook, the British Encyclopedia, the Minorities at Risk Project and the World Christian Encyclopedia. Using combinations of these datasets, and speci…c classi…ca-tion criteria, di¤erent authors have constructed dataset on ethnic groups and ethnic diversity across countries.
The Atlas Nadorov Mira (ANM) is the oldest and most popular source of information on ethnolinguistic groups across countries. It was constructed by Soviet scientists and published in 1964. It uses mainly the linguistic dimension to classify groups although occasionally it uses also race or national origin to distinguish ethnic groups. The ANM has been the main source of data on ethnic diversity for many years. In fact the fractionalization index constructed, using these data, by Hudson and Taylor (1972) (2003) used the source which covered the greatest share of the population. If several sources covered 100% of the population but had di¤erent shares for the groups then they used the most disaggregated data.
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b) use as a basic source the World Christian Encyclopedia, which is one of the most detailed sources of data on ethnic diversity. The World Christian Encyclopedia (WCE) presents a classi…cation that is neither purely racial nor linguistic nor cultural, but ethnolin-guistic. In that respect it is close to the basic criterion of the ANM. The WCE classi…cation is based on the various extant schemes of nearness of languages plus nearness of racial, ethnic, cultural, and cultural-area characteristics. It combines race, language and culture in a single classi…cation, denominated ethnolinguistic, that includes several progressively more detailed levels: 5 major races, 7 colors, 13 geographical races and 4 subraces, 71 ethnolinguistic families , 432 major peoples (subfamilies or ethnic cultural areas), 7,010 distinct languages, 8,990 subpeoples and 17,000 dialects. It is di¢ cult to be consistent in the classi…cation of ethnic groups at the global scale because in di¤erent countries their respective censuses have di¤erent emphasis on each dimension of ethnicity. The main criterion adopted by the WCE in ambiguous situations is the answer of each person to the question: "What is the …rst, or main, or primary ethnic or ethnolinguistic term by which persons identify themselves, or are identi…ed by people around them?".
The WCE details for each country the most diverse classi…cation level. In some countries the most diverse classi…cation may coincide with races while in other could be sub-peoples. Vanhanen (1999) argues that it is important to take into account only the most important ethnic divisions and not all the possible ethnic di¤erences or groups. He uses an informal measure of genetic distance to separate di¤erent degrees of ethnic cleavage. The proxy for genetic distance is "the period of time that two or more compared groups have been separated from each other, in the sense that intergroup marriage has been very rare. The longer the period of endogamous separation the more groups have had time to di¤erentiate".
The measurement of fractionalization and polarization: results from di¤erent datasets
We have seen that there are several datasets that can be use to calculate fractionalization and discrete polarization. In this subsection we discuss the e¤ect on the indices of using each of these datasets. We consider the Atlas Nadorov Mira (ANM), the combination of sources in Montalvo and ReynalQuerol . We also distinguish between the largest available sample of countries and the standard sample.
The largest sample includes all the countries covered by the dataset, or combination of sources, used by each researcher. The standard sample determines the countries that are included e¤ectively in the regessions that researchers use to assess the statistical e¤ect of social fractionalization (polarization) on the likelihood of civil con ‡icts. This means that the samples are additionally restricted by the availability of the explanatory variables. One of the most restrictive explanatory variables is GDP measured in homogeneous terms across countries. For this reason we take as the reference regression sample the set of countries included in the Barro-Lee sample. We de…ned the standard sample as the one that represents the minimum common denominator of countries in the four datasets conditional on being present in the Barro-Lee sample. Table 1 shows the basic characteristics of the distribution of ethnic groups by countries in each dataset for the largest sample and the standard sample. The sample of MRQ is the largest, including 190 countries, followed closely by the sample of ADEKW. The smallest sample is the old ANM (147 countries). The average number of ethnic groups by country is included in the third column. The highest average is associated with the data of MRQ although, as we can see in the standard sample, the average for the ANM dataset is almost double. The data of FEA is the one with the smallest average of ethnic groups. It is interesting to notice that the average number of groups is similar in both samples (largest available and standard) for the MRQ dataset but it is very di¤erent in the case of FEA and ADEKW. Corresponding to these averages, the maximum number of groups is the highest (44) in the ANM dataset and the lowest in the ADEKW data (20) . Figures 1 to 7 depict the detailed distribution of ethnic groups in each dataset in the full sample (1 to 4) and the standard sample (5 to 7). Table 2 describes the main characteristics of fractionalization and polarization calculated from the four datasets 12 . The highest level of average polarization is observed in the FEA dataset (0.58) while the lowest average is associated with the ANNM dataset (0.45). The di¤erence is substantial (more than 25%). This is also the case for the index of fractionalization: the FEA data shows the highest level (0.50) while the ANM is the lowest (0.40).
ADEKW and MRQ present intermediate values (0.44).
How are fractionalization and polarization related in each of these datasets? Table 3 contains the correlation between the measures of fractionalization and polarization in each data source for both samples. The highest correlation in the largest sample happens in the ADEKW dataset (0.73) and the lowest in MRQ (0.6). This result could be expected from the average number of groups by country of each of the datasets. However, if we restrict the sample to the standard one, the highest correlation is observed in the ANM data which, on the other hand, has the largest average number of ethnic groups by country. The data of MRQ show a correlation in the standard sample (0.61) which is quite similar to the correlation calculated for the largest available sample. The data in FEA shows a very large di¤erence between the correlation between fractionalization and polarization in the standard sample and the correlation in the largest sample.
Finally, we analyze the relationship between the calculation of fractionalization, and polarization, among the four basic datasets. Table 4 contains the regressions of fractionalization on one dataset against the same concept in another dataset. In column 1 we see that the coe¢ cient of the regression of the fractionalization index in MRQ on the index in FEA is 0.79 and very signi…cantly di¤erent from 0. This is the case in all the exercises, which implies that the di¤erent measures are highly related despite the fact of using di¤erent datasets in their construction. In general we can say that there are two groups: the measures of fractionalization of MRQ and ANM are highly correlated. The measures of ADEKW and FEA have a lower level of correlation with MRQ and ANM while they are quite correlated. However, in the case of the indices of polarization, the relationship is di¤erent since all the measures but the ANM are closely related. As before, the highest correlation is calculated between FEA and ADEKW.
The empirics of inequality, polarization and con ‡ict
This section describes the empirical literature on the relationship between inequality, ethnicity and con ‡ict. Sen (1973) , among others, claims that there is a very close relationship between inequality and con ‡ict. However, this connection has been very elusive to empirical researchers 13 . Collier and Hoe-er (1998) provide one of the …rst empirical analyses of the relationship between inequality and con ‡ict. They …nd that income inequality is statistically insigni…cant in the explanation of the onset of a civil war. Collier and Hoe-er (1998) also …nd that ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) is not statistically signi…cant for the probability of civil war, but it is weakly signi…cant in the case of the duration of a civil war. Nevertheless, even in this case, the e¤ect is non-linear since the authors …nd that the square of the index of fractionalization is also statistically signi…cant. Collier and Hoe-er (2004) con…rm the empirical irrelevance of income inequality (measured as the Gini index or the ratio of the top-to-bottom quintiles of income using the data of Deininger and Squire 1996). Fearon and Laitin (2003) also …nd that inequality (measure as a Gini index) is not statistically signi…cant.
Cramer (2003) discussed why the literature has paid little attention to inequality, in the light of the fact that it could be an important determinant of con ‡ict. The …rst problem he identi…ed was that the empirical foundations of this relationship were weak, and, second, that there were "common problems in the way in which we de…ne and analyze inequality as well as shortcomings in our ability to measure it." There are two type of problems in the measurement of diversity. First of all there is the issue of the quality of cross country data. Second, there is the question on the appropriate index to measure diversity. We discuss these issues in the following two subsections.
The quality of data and the measurement of inequality
The studies referred to in the previous paragraph use cross country data. The failure of income inequality as an explanatory variable of con ‡ict may be related with the irregular, scarce and low quality of the data on income distribution at the country level. However, the research on the relationship between con ‡ict and ethnic diversity has recently move to more detailed data. Sambanis (2005) describes some case studies in which inequality seems to be an important factor in the explanation of civil wars. Barron et al. (2004) study village-level con ‡ict in Indonesia and …nd that poverty has very little correlation with con ‡ict but changes in economic conditions and the level of unemployment are important. They also …nd that there were "positive of inequality among individuals or households. Horizontal inequality is de…ned as among groups, typically culturally de…ned by race, ethnicity, etc.
associations between local con ‡ict and unemployment, inequality, natural disasters, change in source of incomes, and clustering of ethnic groups within villages." Murshed et al. (2005) conclude that spatial horizontal inequality, or inequality among groups geographically concentrated, was an important explanatory variable for the intensity of con ‡ict in Nepal (measured by the number of deaths) using district-wide data. Similar results on the e¤ect of increasing inequality in Nepal can be found in Macours (2008).
Fractionalization versus polarization
There is a long list of research papers that have found the index of fractionalization (ELF) to be important in the explanation of economic phenomena. Easterly and Levine (1997) , using the ELF index, were the …rst in showing evidence of a negative correlation between ethnic diversity and economic growth. Later on, Alesina et al (2003) There are at least two alternative explanations for this lack of explanatory power. First, it could be the case that the classi…cation of ethnic groups in the Atlas Nadorov Mira (ANM), the source of the traditional index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), is not appropriate. But, as we discussed in section 3, the correlation between the indices of fractionalization obtained using these alternative data sources is very high (over 0.8). Therefore, it is unlikely that this …rst explanation is the reason for the lack of explanatory power of the fractionalization index. The second reason is the calculation of the heterogeneity that matters for con ‡ict as an index of fractionalization. In principle claiming a positive relationship between an index of fractionalization and con ‡icts implies that the more ethnic groups there are the higher is the probability of a con ‡ict. Many authors would dispute such an argument. As already mentioned, Horowitz (1985) argues that the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil wars is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, and more con ‡icts in societies where a large ethnic minority faces an ethnic majority. If this is so then an index of polarization should capture better the likelihood of con‡icts, or the intensity of potential con ‡ict, than an index of fractionalization. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) …nd that ethnic polarization, measured by the RQ index, has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on the incidence of civil wars 14 . Table 6 shows that the relationship between polarization and the incidence of civil wars is unrelated with the speci…c dataset used to calculate the measure of polarization. The logit regressions are classi…ed in two groups: 5-years panel and cross-section. The regressors included in the speci…cations are the usual suspects in the studies on the incidence of civil wars. All the measures of polarization are statistically signi…cant in the case of 5-years periods. In cross section the relationship is weaker than in panel but still the coe¢ cients estimated are statistically signi…cant at 5% (with one of them signi…cant at 10%). If we had included the index of fractionalization it would be statistically insigni…cant no matter what dataset was used to construct the index.
Other studies relate the intensity of civil wars (measure usually by the number of casualties) and social diversity. Do and Iyer (2009) conclude, using data on the casualties across space and over time in districts of Nepal, that there is some evidence that greater social polarization (measure by the caste diversity of Nepal) is associated with higher levels of con ‡ict. They also …nd that linguistic fractionalization and polarization have no signi…cant impact on con ‡ict intensity.
There is less evidence on the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on genocides and mass killings. Har¤ (2003) constructed a dataset on genocides and politicides and tested a structural model of the antecedents of genocide and politicide. Har¤ (2003) identi…es six causal factors and tests, in particular, the hypothesis that the greater the ethnic and religious diversity, the greater the likelihood that communal identity will lead to mobilization and, if con ‡ict is protracted, prompt elite decisions to eliminate the group basis of actual or potential challenges. However, she …nds no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. The variables used to capture potential con ‡ict were measures of diversity (ethnic fractionalization). For this reason, and in line with most of the literature on the determinants of civil wars, Har¤ (2003) concludes that the e¤ect of ethnic diversity on genocides is not statistically relevant. Easterly et al. (2006) analyze the determinant of mass killing which, they clarify, should not be confused with genocides. They …nd that mass killing is related with the square of ethnic fractionalization. This suggests that polarization of a society into to two large groups would be the most dangerous situation even in the case of mass killing. Finally Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) …nd that there is strong relationship between ethnic polarization and the risk of genocide.
Con ‡ict and other measures of ethnic diversity
There is less evidence of the relationship between these alternative measures and the likelihood of con ‡ict. Collier and Hoe-er (1998) …nd that ethnic dominance is the only measure of ethnicity that has a statistically signi…-cant e¤ect on civil wars. Cederman and Girardin (2007) conclude that the coe¢ cient on the N* index 15 is statistically signi…cant in the explanation of the onset of civil wars in contrast with the traditional index of fractional-ization. Lim et al. (2007) argue that ethnic and religious fractionalization (and polarization) are measures of diversity that do not consider the spatial structure of ethnic and religious groups. Their model focus on the geographic distribution of the population as a predictor of con ‡ict. Violence is expected to arise when groups of certain characteristic size are formed and not when groups are much smaller, or larger, than that size. Therefore, highly mixed regions and well-segregated groups are not expected to generate violence 16 . By contrast, partial separation with poorly de…ned boundaries when groups are su¢ ciently large in size able to impose cultural norms are more prone to con ‡ict. Lim et al. (2007) perform simulations, based on census data and an agent model, for the former Yugoslavia and India . They are able to predict with a high level of accuracy the regions of reported violence using only the pixelated geographic map of the location of ethnic groups.
Concluding remarks
This chapter summarizes the basic literature on the relationship between inequality, polarization and con ‡ict. It also presents a novel comparative study of the impact of alternative datasets on the calculation of indices of fractionalization and polarization at the country level that can be of interest for empirical researchers. Inequality of income, wealth, land distribution, etc. has been traditionally associated with the likelihood of social con ‡icts. However, the empirical literature has found no statistical relationship between the likelihood of civil wars and the level of inequality. Ethnic diversity has also been proposed as a likely motive for grievances and, therefore, possibly connected with the probability of civil wars. But the usual measure of ethnic diversity, the index of fractionalization, has no explanatory power on the probability of con ‡ict once the standard explanatory variables are included in the speci…cation. The index of polarization is an alternative way to summarize ethnolinguistic heterogeneity in a single indicator. The index of polarization reaches the highest level when there are two groups of similar size that cover the whole population. Therefore, when a majority is confronted with a large minority. Many social scientists have argued that this is the social con…guration that produces the highest likelihood of con ‡ict. The empirical evidence supports this claim.
The literature in this area is moving fast to more specialized measures of ethnolinguistic diversity that factor in the indices of the spatial distribution of the ethnic groups, the sharpness of the frontier across groups or the degree of overlap between ethnic groups in the same geographical area. Although there are still few results on the relationship between these measures and the likelihood of con ‡icts, this is a very exciting area of research for the future. 
